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Figure 1: Illustration of Type 1 and Type 2 reasoning as conceptualized by Tversky and Kahneman. Type 1, our intuitive system, is at
the forefront of decision-making processes while Type 2, our analytic system, operates secondarily.
ABSTRACT
As visualization researchers evaluate the impact of visualization de-
sign on decision-making, they often hold a one-dimensional perspec-
tive on the cognitive processes behind making a decision. Several
psychological and economical researchers have shown that to make
decisions, people rely on quantitative reasoning as well as gist-based
intuition – two systems that operate in parallel. In this position pa-
per, we discuss decision theories and provide suggestions to bridge
the gap between the evaluation of decision-making in visualization
and psychology research. The goal is to question the limits of our
knowledge and to advocate for a more nuanced understanding of
decision-making with visualization.
Index Terms: Human-centered computing—Visualization—
Visualization techniques—Decision-making; Human-centered
computing—Visualization—Visualization design and evaluation
methods
1 INTRODUCTION
We make hundreds of decisions every day, ranging from trivial to
complex. Such choices could include when to leave our house to
catch the bus or whether to take an umbrella when there is a high
chance of rain. More complex decisions could include whether to
invest in the stock market given the potential return value. Whether
decisions seem complex or mundane, they are guided by two types
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of reasoning, commonly referred to as Type 1 and Type 2. Type
1 guides our intuition and recognition patterns while Type 2 is re-
sponsible for analytical thinking [7]. The dual-process theory has
been popularized in Daniel Kahneman’s book “Thinking Fast and
Slow”, where they describe Type 1 as the dominant system in charge
of reasoning and judgment. However, this notion of two parallel
systems is formalized with Fuzzy Trace Theory (FTT), where the
two systems are defined as gist (high level) and verbatim (detail
level) reasoning [12]. FTT posits that people make decisions from
gist-based intuition, a “fuzzy” representation of the information ex-
tracted. This theory has challenged the prior misconception that
decision-making is, in its most advanced form, rooted in pure logic.
We assert that understanding the role of Type 1 and Type 2 reason-
ing in decision-making with visualization is critical. In many cases,
it is increasingly common to use data visualization to support reason-
ing about risks and to aid sound decision-making, and its impact can
be colossal [11]. For example, the ‘flatten the curve’ visualization
helped shape the public lexicon during the COVID-19 pandemic.
While the topic of decision-making has been explored by many visu-
alization researchers, they often focus on the binary outcome of a
decision rather than the decision-making process. Their findings are
often limited to the task at hand, and often contradict other research
areas that evaluate visual aides using gist measures. In this paper,
we discuss the current methods for visualization evaluation in the
context of decision-making, and provide suggestions to adopt a more
nuanced and holistic approach in the visualization community.
2 DUAL PROCESS IN DECISION-MAKING
Fuzzy Trace Theory states that people make decisions by extract-
ing meaning from verbatim input to make a gist-based judgment.
We rely on the least precise gist representation necessary to make
a decision [12], generally referred to as “fuzzy processing prefer-
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ence”. Because precision is often associated with accuracy, many
believe that quantitative reasoning is superior to qualitative reason-
ing. However, Reyna et al. showed that experts in the medical field
tend to engage more in gist-based decision-making compared to
novices [13]. Tversky and Kahneman made the argument that intu-
ition is a synonym for recognition [7]. Experts recognize familiar
situations and can therefore make fast and accurate decisions even
when they are complex.
While gist reasoning has been proven to be effective, Type 1
reasoning is also more susceptible to false first impressions and
framing effects. Consider the following question:
A bat and ball cost $1.10. The bat costs $1 more than
the ball. How much does the ball cost?
More than 50% of students at Harvard, Princeton and the Mas-
sachusetts Institute of Technology routinely give the incorrect an-
swer, insisting the ball costs 10 cents [7] 1. Type 1 1 is at the
forefront of cognitive processes, and it often requires significant
effort to switch from Type 1 to Type 2 reasoning in order to avoid
cognitive biases.
Before the acknowledgement of the role of Type 1, many believed
that Type 2 was solely in charge of decision-making operations.
Expected Utility Theory, prevalent in the field of economics, posits
that people make decisions rationally, using Type 2 reasoning to
compute the utility of events. The recognition of dual modes of
reasoning lead to the development of Prospect Theory [8], and
revolutionized the way economists think about decision-making.
3 VISUALIZATION AND DECISION-MAKING
Many scholars have investigated the impact of visualization on risk
perception and decisions [1, 2, 4, 5, 9, 10]. A number of these
studies evaluate the impact of visualization design on decisions by
prompting participants for probability estimates. For example, Kay
et al. evaluated visualizations in their ability to communicate the
uncertainty of transit data by asking participants to estimate the
likeliness of bus arrival times on a scale of 0 to 100 [10]. We believe
that prompting participants for a numerical estimate compels them
1The correct answer to this problem is that the ball costs 5 cents and the
bat costs — at a dollar more — $1.05 for a grand total of $1.10.
Figure 2: The 6 visualization designs used in Feldman’s study [3].
Participants were shown two percentages (in 1 format) and asked
to choose i) which one was larger/smaller (gist) and ii) estimate the
size of the difference (verbatim). Their response time was recorded to
observe the ease of communication of visualization designs. Other
measures were investigated such as the effect of background color
and the presence of scales and numbers.
to use their Type 2 reasoning to understand the visualization and
does not reflect how most people make decisions in real-life: by
gisting. Others have used realistic simulations to observe the direct
impact of visualization design on decisions. Kay et al. has observed
people’s ability to leave the house on time to catch the bus while
minimizing waiting time at the bus stop [10]. Greis et al. has used a
Facebook game “Farm Smart” to observe how participants best grow
and sell crops given uncertainty weather information [5]. Bisantz
et al.has used a missile game where uncertainty was encoded with
opacity to observe people’s ability to successfully shoot missiles
and avoid harmless objects like birds and planes [1]. A number of
other researchers have used similar games and simulations [1, 2, 9].
While there is value in knowing which visualization will lead to
which outcome, the findings are limited to the task at hand and
fail to provide a comprehensive understanding of decision-making
processes.
In the medical field, researchers have investigated the impact of
visualization design on gist reasoning. Feldman et al. compared the
performance of 6 different visualization formats in inducing gist or
detail-level processing [3] (see figure 2). The results suggest that
systematic ovals are likely the format that represents the best com-
promise for accurate processing of both gist and detailed information
while also demanding relatively little effort. Hawley et al. found that
viewing a pictograph was associated with adequate levels of both
gist and verbatim knowledge, and that superior medical treatment
choices were made in both cases [6].
Both Feldman et al. and Hawley et al. observed gist and verbatim
knowledge when comparing two options: size of proportion and
effectiveness of treatment respectively. There is a need to further
investigate the decoding and extraction of both high level and detail-
level information in other types of tasks such as Bayesian Reasoning.
4 FUTURE DIRECTIONS AND CONCLUSION
“We live most of our lives guided by the impressions of System 1.”
- Tversky and Kahneman
To deepen our understanding of the effect of visualization on
decisions, we need to look at how people make decisions. We
suggest the following research questions, many of which are core to
understanding the role of visualization.
• Do people default to gist or verbatim reasoning when using
visualization?
• Can a visualization design elicit gist or verbatim reasoning
strategy?
• How does gist and verbatim reasoning with visualization influ-
ence the decisions people make?
It is important to understand how people make decisions from
visualizations. More specifically, understanding whether a visual
encoding facilitates gist or verbatim reasoning can have huge impli-
cations for visualization designers. By expanding our knowledge
in this area, we can tailor visualizations to our audience, or to a
specific problem area. Bridging the gap between how psycholo-
gists and visualization researchers reason about decision-making
can revolutionize the way we evaluate and design our visualizations.
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